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INTRODUCTION

Currently, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, in Cleveland Athletic Club, Inc. v. United States,1 and the
Second Circuit, in Brook, Inc. v. C.LR.,2 are in conflict about
whether a tax-exempt social club can deduct its net expenses attributable to sales of meals to nonmembers from its net investment
* Tax Law Specialist with the Internal Revenue Service (National Office),
Employee Plans/Exempt Organizations Office, Employee Plans Technical and Actuarial Division, Washington, D.C. B.A., Cornell University, 1981; J.D., University
of Toledo College of Law, 1985; LL.M. Taxation, Georgetown University Law

Center, 1987. The content of this article is the opinion of the writer and does not
necessarily represent the position of the Internal. Revenue Service.
1. 779 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir. 1985).
2. 799 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1986).
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income in determining the club's unrelated business taxable income under section 512(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code
("Code").' The conflict at issue affects the amount of unrelated
business income tax that a social club may incur. In addition, the
resolution of the issue may affect the amount of expenses that can
be attributed to a social club's sales of meals to nonmembers. This
article examines the unrelated business income taxation of social
clubs, the Brook and the Cleveland Athletic Club cases, which
opinion is correct and why, and the ramifications of these
decisions.
II. THE

BROOK AND THE CLEVELAND ATHLETIC CLUB CASES

A. The District Court's Decision in the Cleveland Athletic Club
Case
On July 19, 1984, in Cleveland Athletic Club, Inc. v. United
States,4 the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio held that a tax-exempt social club 'could not net its excess
expenses attributable to the sales of meals to nonmembers against
its net income from investments. This case concerned the Cleveland Athletic Club, which is a tax-exempt social club as described
in section 501(c)(7) of the Code.6 Organized to provide entertainment, amusement, and athletic recreation to its members, the
Cleveland Athletic Club supplemented the income it received from
membership dues with unrelated business income derived from investments and sales of food and beverages to nonmembers.' In
conducting the sales operation, the club incurred a net loss. 7 On its

income tax returns for the fiscal years ending in 1975, 1976, 1977,
and 1978, the Cleveland Athletic Club offset its excess expenses
from the food and beverage sales against its net investment income.' The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") determined that the
3. Compare 779 F.2d 1160 with 799 F.2d 833. All references to Code are to

sections of the Code of 1954, as amended.
4. 588 F. Supp. 1305 (N.D. Ohio 1984), rev'd, 779 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir. 1985).
5. Id. at 1306. I.R.C. section 501(a) in pertinent part provides a tax exemption for organizations described in section 501(c). Organizations that fall within
section 501(c)(7) are "Clubs organized for pleasure, recreation, and other nonprofitable purposes, substantially all of the activities of which are for such purposes
and no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder."
6. 588 F. Supp. at 1306.
7. Id.

8. Id.
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss2/2
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Code did not allow the Cleveland Athletic Club to offset its investment income with those expenses.9
Section 511 of the Code imposes a tax on the "unrelated business taxable income" of social clubs that are exempt under section
501(c)(7).10 The definition of "unrelated business taxable income"
as it applies to section 501(c)(7) organizations is found in section
512(a)(3)(A) of the Code." Under section 512(a)(3)(A), the term
"unrelated business taxable income" is defined in pertinent part as
"the gross income (excluding any exempt function income), less
the deductions allowed by this chapter which are directly connected with the production of the gross income (excluding exempt
function income) .
".1.."2
The court decided that expenses deductible under section 512(a)(3)(A) must be directly connected with
the production of gross income and be a deduction "allowed by
this chapter."13 The parties had already stipulated that the
claimed deductions were directly connected with the production of
gross income, so the district court focused on the meaning of the
phrase "allowed by this chapter.""' The court averred that the
phrase could be read only to refer to Chapter One of the Code."
The Cleveland Athletic Club court supported this interpretation
by citing to Deputy v. du Pont, 6 which held that courts must interpret and read the Code according to its plain meaning. The
court reasoned that, in view of the plain meaning of section
512(a)(3)(A), section 162(a) of the Code applied because it provided Chapter One's general rule for the deduction of trade or business expenses. 7 Thus, the district court would allow the deduction of the expenses claimed by the club only if the expenses met
the requirements of section 162(a).18
Section 162(a) states that "[tihere shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business
9. Id.
10. I.R.C. § 511.
11. I.R.C. § 512(a)(3)(A).
12. Id.
13. 588 F. Supp. at 1307.

14. Id. at 1307-08.
15. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-1379, cited in id. at 1308.
16.
17.
18.
19.

308 U.S. 488 (1940), cited in 588 F. Supp. at 1307-08.
588 F. Supp. at 1308.
See id.
I.R.C. § 162(a).
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The court noted that, whether activities rise to the level of carrying on a "trade or business" within the meaning of the statute is to
a great extent a matter of degree, and the determination of this
issue depends on the facts in each case.20 In addition, the district
court stated that prominent among the factors for deciding
whether a taxpayer carries on a "trade or business" is the existence
or absence of a profit motive. 1 Moreover, the Cleveland Athletic
Club court ruled that the existence of a profit motive must be established before the club can deduct from its investment income
its net losses from its sales of food and beverages to nonmembers.22
20. 588 F. Supp. at 1308. See generally Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S.
212 (1941) ("to determine whether the activities of a taxpayer are 'carrying on a
business' requires an examination of the facts in each case"); see also C.I.R. v.
Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. 980, 988 (1987) ("We therefore adhere to the general position of the Higgins Court, taken 45 years ago, that resolution of this issue requires
an examination of the facts in each case."). Generally, the Code and the Treasury
regulations provide scant assistance as to what facts are considered and the conclusions that can be drawn with regard to the existence of a "trade or business"
for purposes of section 162. Boyle, What is a Trade or Business?, 39 TAX LAWYER
737 (1986). However, it is possible to summarize the pertinent facts generally reviewed by the courts. Id. These facts are as follows:
(1) good faith intention of making a profit or producing income;
(2) extensive activities over a substantial period of time;
(3) whether the activity has actually begun; and
(4) whether the taxpayer holds himself out to others as engaged in the
selling of goods and services.
Id. at 742-43.
21. 588 F. Supp. at 1308. See generally McDowell v. Ribicoff, 292 F.2d 174,
178 (3d Cir. 1961) ("It is well established that the existence of a genuine profit
motive is the most important criterion for the finding that a given course of activity constitutes a trade or business."); Boyle, supra note 20, at 758-59 ("Of the
four factors used to determine whether an activity constitutes a trade or business
[see id. at 759], the one most accepted by the courts is the profit motive. This is
an absolute necessity."). It is interesting to note that neither the Code or the
Treasury regulations define the term "trade or business."
22. 588 F. Supp. at 1308. Rev. Rul. 81-69, 1981-1 C.B. 351, also concerned the
issue of whether a social club could offset against its net investment income its
net excess expenses that the club consistently experienced over a number of years
from sales of food and beverages to nonmembers. The ruling supports the court's
position by holding that under section 512(a)(3)(A) "deductions allowed by Chapter One" means that the proposed deductions must meet section 162. Id. The
costs of expenses for nonmembers were held not to be deductible under section
162 of the Code because they were not related to a profit-seeking activity. Id.
Therefore, such expenses were not allowed to be offset against the club's net investment income. Id.
In Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-51-003 (Sept. 13, 1985), an examining agent concluded

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss2/2
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253

The court held that the primary motive for the club's nonmember
food and beverage sales was not to earn a profit but, rather, to
defer part of the fixed or overhead expenses that otherwise would
2" Therefore, the club could not take the
be paid by its members.
24
deductions at issue.
The court's holding flows from two premises: first, the term
"allowed by this chapter" in section 512(a)(3)(A) refers to Chapter
One of the Code; and, second, the only section in which the taxpayer's proposed deductions could fall is section 162. These assumptions are reasonable since both sections 512(a)(3)(A) and 162
are included in Chapter One and section 512(a)(3)(A) unequivocally states that the only deductions permitted thereunder are
those "allowed by this chapter."26 In addition, even though the
that, because a social club's sales of food, beverages, and other products and services to nonmembers had consistently resulted in net losses for a number of years,
no deduction should be allowed for such losses. The IRS stated that the taxpayer
contended Rev. Rul. 81-69 should not apply unless there were continual losses
generated from sales to nonmembers where the cost of goods sold and directly
connected expenses do not exceed the amount charged. Id. The government
added that the taxpayer thus believed that indirect overhead costs should not be
considered in deciding whether sales to nonmembers were profit motivated. Id.
The IRS held that the term "costs" as used in Rev. Rul. 81-69 means "all costs,"
including allocable indirect costs such as overhead and depreciation, and not
merely the direct costs of nonmember sales. Id. Accordingly, the IRS disallowed
the taxpayer's proposed deductions. Id.
The Cleveland Athletic Club court, citing Five Lakes Outing Club v. United
States, 468 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1972), and Adirondack League Club v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 796 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 458 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1972), also
noted that the profit motive requirement has been used to deny deductions to
other tax-exempt organizations. 588 F. Supp. at 1308. Although Adirondack
League and Five Lakes Outing did not involve tax-exempt organizations as the
Cleveland Athletic Club court claimed, the facts and the holdings of these cases
are worth noting. In Adirondack League, a nonexempt social club maintained a
hunting and fishing preserve for the benefit of its members. 55 T.C. at 797. It also
recorded a substantial amount of income from profitable timber operations on its
property. Id. at 805. The issue in the case was whether the club's losses from
providing facilities and services to its members could be applied against the timber income. Id. at 807. In holding against the club, the Tax Court stated that a
profit motive is a prerequisite to deductibility under section 162(a) for a nonprofit
social club. Id. at 809. In Five Lakes Outing, a nonexempt social club wanted to
deduct losses arising from its recreational operations against income it received
from an outside source. 468 F.2d at 443. In holding against the taxpayer, the
Eighth Circuit provided the rule set forth in Adirondack League. Id. at 445.
23. 588 F. Supp. at 1309.
24. Id.
25. Under the Code in effect at the time the decision was rendered (the Code
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1988
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sales of meals to nonmembers were not made for profit, the sales
did resemble business-like activities.26 Section 162 is the only section that allows a deduction for ordinary and necessary business
expenses." Therefore, section 162 was the appropriate deduction
section with regard to the sales expenses.
B. The Tax Court's Decision in the Brook Case
In The Brook, Inc.,2 8 decided on September 4, 1985, the Tax
Court also grappled with the issue of whether a tax-exempt social
club could net its excess expenses attributable to the sales of meals
to nonmembers against its net income from investments. The facts
of this case were almost identical to those in Cleveland Athletic
Club.2 " The petitioner in the case, The Brook, was a private social
club that qualified for tax exemption under section 501(c)(7).1 °
During its 1979 and 1980 fiscal years, The Brook had unrelated
business taxable income from two sources: investments and food
and beverages sold to nonmembers at private dinner parties hosted
by club members.3 1 In this period the club had investment income
of $31,951 but avoided paying tax on this income by deducting
from it net losses incurred in the sales of meals to nonmembers.32
The IRS held that The Brook could deduct only expenses incurred
in supplying food and beverages to nonmembers up to the amount
of income the club received from such activities." However, unlike
the Cleveland Athletic Club, when The Brook's case came to trial,
the club stipulated that it did not have any section 162 profit moof 1984 which amended the Code of 1954), Chapter One covered sections 1
through 1379.
26. Sales of goods are often regarded as "business-like" activities. See, e.g.,
Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. at 987 ("[T]he offering of goods. . . usually would qualify
the activity as a . . . business . . ").
27. See the I.R.C. The rule in most federal circuit courts is that "deductibility of 'business-like' expenses or losses is denied unless the taxpayer can show an
intention to seek profit." Bessenyey v. Commissioner, 379 F.2d 252, 256 (2d Cir.
1967); accord, e.g., Brannen v. Commissioner, 722 F.2d 695, 704 (11th Cir. 1984);
International Trading Co. v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 578, 584 (7th Cir. 1960).
28. 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 959 (1985), aff'd, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 133 (1985), aff'd,
799 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1986).
29. Id. at 960-61.
30. Id. at 960.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 961.
33. Id. at 962.

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss2/2
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tive when it engaged in the sales at issue. 4
The Brook court held for the Commissioner on two grounds."5
The Tax Court's major basis for ruling against the taxpayer rested
on a finding that section 512(a)(3)(A) requires a nexus between an
expense and the income against which it is to be offset.3 6 The court
cited Ye Mystic Krewe of Gasparilla v. Commissioner,3 7 a Tax
Court case, as authority. 8
In Krewe, the taxpayer, an entity that qualified for tax exemption under the predecessor of section 501(c)(7),3 9 was organized to
hold certain annual social events. 40 One of these events included a
reenactment of an invasion of the City of Tampa, Florida, by a
replica of an 18th century pirate ship, followed by a parade. 4 1 During the post-1969 years in issue, the taxpayer received net income
of expenses resulting from its award by the city of concession
rights along the parade route but also incurred expenses for the
staged invasion and the parade.4 2 The pertinent issue presented in
Krewe was whether the taxpayer was entitled to offset its invasion
and parade expenses against its concession income. 43 In this case,
the court averred that the resolution of this issue depended upon
whether the costs were "directly connected with" the generation of
the concession income within the meaning of section
512(a)(3)(A). 44 The Krewe court held that, since the words "directly connected with" also appear in section 512(a)(1) of the
Code, the regulations under that section can be used for interpreting the phrase as it appears in section 512(a)(3)(A). 45 The court
stated Treasury Regulation section 1.512(a)-l(a) takes the position
that the "directly connected with" language imposes a requirement
in addition to that otherwise applicable to a claimed deduction; to
meet such a requirement, an expense must have a "proximate and
primary" relationship to the carrying on of the unrelated taxable
34. 799 F.2d at 838 (noting the facts of the Brook case).
35. See infra notes 36-58 and accompanying text.
36. 50 T.C.M. (CCH) at 962.
37. 80 T.C. 755 (1983).
38. 50 T.C.M. (CCH) at 962.
39. 80 T.C. at 756-57.
40. Id. at 756.
41. Id. at 757.
42. Id. at 758-59.
43. Id. at 765.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 766-67.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1988
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business."6 Under this rationale, a social club's earnings from a specific activity in a given year would place a ceiling on the deductions
that such activity could generate in that year. Losses from one taxable activity could not offset gains from another. The court went
on to hold that the invasion and parade were activities carried on
independently of the operation of the concessions and that expenses of those activities were independent from the production of
concession income. 7 Therefore, the taxpayer was not entitled to
offset its invasion and parade expenses against its concession
income.""
In Brook, as in Krewe, the taxpayer sought to net the excess
expenses from one activity (i.e., the food and beverage sales to
nonmembers) against the income from another activity (i.e., investments). 4" The court held that, since no direct nexus between
such activities had been demonstrated by the taxpayer, pursuant
to Krewe the excess expenses could not serve to offset independent
net investment income under section 512(a)(3)(A) during the years
at issue.6 0
It is interesting to note that The Brook petitioned for reconsideration of this case. On this motion, both the taxpayer and the
Commissioner claimed in part that the Tax Court's interpretation
of section 512 of the Code conflicted with the intent of the statute." l Specifically, both parties claimed that, in certain situations,
section 512(a)(3) of the Code allows the expenses of one nonexempt function activity to be deducted from unrelated business taxable income.52 This differs from the Tax Court's holding in Brook
that losses cannot be aggregated to offset income from two or more
unrelated businesses entered into for profit unless there exists a
nexus between them."3 However, in a supplemental decision issued
on December 17, 1985, the Tax Court disagreed with the position
of the taxpayer and the IRS. 4
The Tax Court in Brook also found support for its conclusion
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 766. See Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-l(a) (as amended in 1983).
80 T.C. at 767.
Id.
50 T.C.M. (CCH) at 962.

50. Id. at 962-63.
51. The Brook, Inc. v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 133, 133-35 (1985),
aff'd, 799 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1986).

52. Id.
53. See supra notes 36-50 and accompanying text.
54. Id. at 133.
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss2/2
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in the legislative purpose behind the enactment of section
512(a)(3).5 5 The court said that the legislative history accompanying section 512(a)(3) made it clear that the statute was enacted
particularly to tax investment income. 56 To support this finding,
the Tax Court quoted a Treasury Department proposal that the
court said resulted in the enactment of section 512(a)(3):
Thus, under the proposal, all income other than that from members in exchange for exempt function facilities, would be included
in gross income whether or not the activities generating the income, were sufficient to meet the requirements of a 'trade or business regularly carried on' generally applicable under the unrelated business tax. Income from an investment [footnote omitted]
would be subject to the [unrelated business income] tax whether
or not the activities engaged in by the social club in generating
that income were sufficient to meet5 the taxpayer business test of
the unrelated business income tax. 7
Thus, the court undoubtedly reasoned that the statute was enacted
particularly to tax investment income because the Treasury Department specifically set forth investment income as one type of
income that would be subject to the unrelated business income tax.
The court held that, since section 512(a)(3) was enacted to tax investment income in particular, the taxpayer must not be allowed to
offset its excess expenses from its sales of meals to nonmembers
against its investment income.
C. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' Decision in the Cleveland Athletic Club Case
On December 23, 1985, in Cleveland Athletic Club, Inc. v.
55. 50 T.C.M. (CCH) at 963.
56. Id.
57. Technical Explanation of Treasury Tax Reform Proposals, Hearings on
the Subject of Tax Reform before the Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. p. 14, 5050, 5139-41 (1969) [hereinafter cited as the Treasury Tax Reform Proposals], quoted in 50 T.C.M. at 961.
58. 50 T.C.M. at 963. The Brook court stated in its holding:
[W]e think that this holding comports with the purpose of section
512(a)(3), which was to tax income, and particularly investment income,
which a social club receives from non-members sources. If the taxpayer's
position were adopted, its investment income would wholly avoid taxation .

...
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United States,5 9 the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and held that a social club can offset its excess expenses
from the sales of meals to nonmembers against its net income from
investments. The circuit court reasoned, as the district court did
not, that the challenged deductions need not come within the section 162 trade or business allowance."' In support of its decision,
the Sixth Circuit compared the definition of "unrelated business
taxable income" as it applies to section 501(c)(7) organizations
under section 512(a)(3)(A) to the general definition of "unrelated
business taxable income" as provided in section 512(a)(1)."1 As
stated previously, section 512(a)(3)(A) provides that the term "unrelated business taxable income" is "the gross income (excluding
any exempt function income), less the deductions allowed by this
chapter which are directly connected with the production of the
gross income (excluding exempt function income) .....61
Under section 512(a)(1), the general definition of "unrelated business taxable income" is:
the gross income derived by any organization from any unrelated
trade or business (as defined in section 513) regularly carried on
by it, less the deductions allowed by this chapter which are directly connected with the carrying on of such trade or business,
both computed with the modifications provided in subsection
(b). 63

One major distinction between the two definitions is that section 512(a)(1) refers to a "trade or business" while section
512(a)(3)(A) does not." The Sixth Circuit concluded that the difference in the language established that section 512(a)(3)(A) does
not have a profit motive requirement. 65 The omission of the phrase
59. 779 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir. 1985).
60. Id. at 1165.
61. Id.
62. I.R.C. § 512(a)(3)(A).
63. I.R.C. § 512(a)(1).
64. Compare I.R.C. § 512(a)(1) with I.R.C. § 512(a)(3)(A).
65. 779 F.2d at 1165. The court of appeals in Cleveland Athletic Club also
argued that Rev. Rul. 81-69, supra note 22, is an improper interpretation of section 512(a)(3)(A). 779 F.2d at 1166. As noted above, Rev. Rul. 81-69 held on facts
similar to the facts of the Brook and the Cleveland Athletic Club cases that a
claimed deduction may be taken only if the activity it is connected with is a
profit-seeking activity. See supra note 22. Therefore, the Second Circuit held that
the revenue ruling is also invalid under the law. 799 F.2d 833. The court attacked
Rev. Rul. 81-69 by arguing that its authority was weak. 799 F.2d at 1166. Specifihttps://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss2/2
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"trade or business" in section 512(a)(3)(A) undoubtedly helped the
court to reach its conclusion. In addition, the Sixth Circuit held
that the profit-motivation requirement was important only for distinguishing between an activity carried on as a "trade or business"
as opposed to that of a hobby.6 Moreover, the court stated that
the deductions at issue were allowable merely if they are ordinary
and necessary to the production of income with economic gain as
their basic purpose and that deductibility under section
512(a)(3)(A) does not depend on whether an entity entered into
nonmember business activity with the purpose of generating a tax
profit.61

The Sixth Circuit, citing to a congressional report, also stated:
[A]ll income other than exempt function income would be included in gross income regardless of whether the activity generating the gross income met the requirements of a 'trade or business
regularly carried on' which generally apply under the unrelated
business income tax. That publication [the congressional report]
also stated that to remain consistent 'deductions would be allowable if directly connected with an activity generating income subject to tax rather than only if directly connected with an unrelated trade or business regularly carried on.' 8
cally, the Sixth Circuit claimed that the only legal authority cited in the revenue
ruling and that forms the basis for that ruling is Iowa State Univ. of Science and
Technology v. United States, 500 F.2d 508 (1974). Id. The Second Circuit distinguished Iowa State by noting that, unlike Cleveland Athletic Club, Iowa State
dealt with the attempted deduction of expenditures produced by the operation of
an exempt activity from income produced by a nonexempt function. Id. In addition, the Second Circuit found that Iowa State was decided under sections
501(c)(3) and 512(a)(1), not sections 501(c)(7) and 512(a)(3)(A), which were at
issue in Cleveland Athletic Club. Id. The Cleveland Athletic Club court successfully distinguished Iowa State from the Cleveland Athletic Club case. Therefore,
Rev. Rul. 81-69 has no legal force and effect in the type of case that the Cleveland
Athletic Club court addressed.
66. See 779 F.2d at 1165. The court cited the following for its authority:
"The profit factor is really only significant insofar as it is a means of distinguishing between an enterprise carried on in good faith as a 'trade or business' and an
enterprise carried on merely as a hobby." 4 A. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION § 25.08 (1972), quoted in Trustees of Graceland Cemetary Improvement Fund v. United States, 515 F.2d 763, 778 (1975), quoted in 779 F.2d at 1165.
67. 779 F.2d at 1165.
68. 779 F.2d at 1165-66 quoting Tax Reform Studies and Proposals, U.S.
Treasury Department House Ways and Means Comm. and Senate Finance
Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3 at 325 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Tax Reform
Studies and Proposals].
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1988
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Although the court never stated its reason for relying on this authority, 9 these propositions support the assertion that section
512(a)(3) (A) has no profit-motivation requirement, since the report
claimed that deductions would be allowable regardless of whether
they were connected with an unrelated trade or business.
The Sixth Circuit also held against the IRS on another
ground. 0 Specifically, the court averred that section 512(a)(3)(A)
allows all unrelated business income and losses to be aggregated
1 In support of
rather than treated separately.7
this position, the
court cited a proposed Treasury regulation that has since been
withdrawn. 7 The Sixth Circuit stated that, while a proposed Treasury regulation has no legal force and effect, it still supplies some
evidence of Treasury's application for the interpretation of section
512(a)(3)(A). 3
Another distinction between the language of sections
512(a)(3)(A) and 512(a)(1) further supports the Sixth Circuit's aggregation rule. 74 Specifically, the word "such" prefaces the reference to "trade or business" in section 512(a)(1). 75 The proper interpretation and plain meaning of the phrase "such trade or
business''76 can only be that a particular trade or business is at
issue. Therefore, the statute mandates the segregation of losses,
deductions, gains, or credits of a specific business. Since the word
"such" is not found in section 512(a)(3)(A), 7 the statute appears
not to limit the deductions to any particular source. Therefore, by
negative implication, section 512(a)(3)(A) would allow all unrelated
business income and losses to be aggregated.
69. See 779 F.2d at 1165-66.
70. See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
71. 779 F.2d at 1166.
72. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-3(b)(3), 36 Fed. Reg. 8808 (1971)(withdrawn
in 52 Fed. Reg. 2724 (1987)), cited in 779 F.2d at 1166. Proposed Treasury Regulation section 1.512(a)-3(b)(3) provided:
(3) Income from more than one source. In the case of a social club or an
employees' association which derives gross income [excluding exempt
function income] from two or more sources, its unrelated business taxable income is computed by aggregating its gross income from all such
sources and by aggregating its deductions allowed with respect to such
gross income.
73. 779 F.2d at 1166.
74. See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
75. I.R.C. § 512(a)(1).
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. I.R.C. § 512(a)(3)(A).
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D. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals' Decision in the Brook
Case
In The Brook, Inc. v. C.LR., 78 decided August 21, 1986, the
Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the Tax Court and held
against the taxpayer. However, the circuit court reached its ruling
for different reasons.7 9 The Second Circuit also adhered to the
Sixth Circuit's "aggregation" theory and it disagreed with the Tax
Court's position that the "directly connected" phrase in section
512(a)(3)(A) creates a requirement that an expense may be offset
only against income it directly helped to generate.8 0 The court
based this conclusion on two grounds.8 1 First, it pointed out that
section 512(a)(3)(A) plainly states that allowable deductions
should be taken from "gross income," and the statute only requires
that the deductions be related to the production of that "gross income."8 2 The circuit court noted that section 61 of the Code defines "gross income" as "all income from whatever source derived. 813 The court determined that the term refers to the sum
total of the taxpayer's income except for that which is specifically
excluded. 4 The Second Circuit concluded that section 512(a)(3)(A)
on its face allows deductions to be taken against the sum total of a
social club's nonexempt gross income, not just from the portion related to the particular deduction. 8 Moreover, the court explained
that the "directly connected" language simply requires that the deductions arise from the generation of gross income, disregarding
any exempt function income, i.e., that the deduction be related to
the production of some portion of the social club's total taxable
gross income.88
78. 799 F.2d 833.

79. See id. at 837-38.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 837.
83. Id. See I.R.C. § 61(a).
84. 799 F.2d at 837.
85. Id.
86. Id. The Second Circuit also reinforced its argument on this issue by
claiming that legislative history supported its reading of the statute. Id. The court,
stated that the Treasury Department noted, when proposing section 512(a)(3)(A)
to the House and Senate, that "gross income" as used in section 512(a)(3)(A)
meant "all income, other than that from members in exchange for exempt function facilities." Tax Reform Studies and Proposals,supra note 68, at 325, cited in
id. The Second Circuit court claimed that the Treasury Department did not suggest that deductions would exceed the income produced by the activity for which
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The court also disagreed with the Tax Court's "directly connected" theory because the Second Circuit believed that such proposition was inconsistent with Congress's intent in adopting section 512(a)(3)(A).87 The court quoted House and Senate reports
that stated Congress enacted section 512(a)(3)(A) "to allow individuals to join together to provide recreational or social facilities
on a mutual basis, without tax consequences . . .[so that] the individual is in substantially the same position as if he had spent his
income on pleasure or recreation (or other benefits) without the
intervening separate organization." 88 The Second Circuit, citing to
the same congressional reports,8 9 stated that the legislative intent
behind the enactment of the statute was to insure that social club
members should not suffer tax losses or receive tax benefits merely
because they had banded together in a social club for recreation or
pleasure.9 0 The court reasoned that, if the club members had acted
as individuals or a nonexempt corporation, they would be allowed
to offset the expense of engaging in an activity for profit against
total gross income without any requirement that the income from a
specific business enterprise in any given year exceed the deductible
costs of that activity."1 The Second Circuit concluded that the effect of the Tax Court's interpretation would be to punish social
clubs by not allowing them to aggregate deductions and income
generated from an unrelated business activity as allowed by section
2
162 to other taxpayers.
Although the appellate court disagreed with the Tax Court's
the deduction was taken. 799 F.2d at 837. The court further noted that, to the
contrary, the Treasury Department stressed that "deductions would be allowable
if directly connected with an activity generating income subject to tax." Tax Reform Studies and Proposals, supra note 68, at 325, cited in id. (emphasis in
original).
87. 799 F.2d at 837.
88. S. REP.No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 C.B.
423, 469-70); H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 47 (1969), reprinted
in 1969-3 C.B. 200, 231; reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1645,
1693, 2027, 2100, quoted in 799 F.2d at 837 (emphasis in original).
89. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. 71 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 C.B.
423, 469-70; H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 47 (1969), reprinted
in 1969-3 C.B. 200, 231; 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1645, 1693, 2027,
2100, cited in 799 F.2d at 837.
90. 799 F.2d at 837.
91. Id. at 838.
92. Id.
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss2/2
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reading of the law,93 it held that The Brook was still required to
establish that section 162 of Chapter One, which the court said is
incorporated by reference in section 512(a)(3)(A), would allow a
deduction from investment income of the losses incurred in serving
meals to nonmembers." The Second Circuit held that, since expenses of an activity can be deducted under section 162 only if
such activity is engaged in for profit and The Brook stipulated that
it had no profit motive when it engaged in the unrelated activity of
selling meals to nonmembers, 95 the club could not take the deductions at issue.9 6
The Second Circuit faulted the Sixth Circuit's position that a
social club may deduct expenses generated from activities in which
it did not engage for profit so long as the club engaged in the activity with a basic purpose of economic gain.97 The court said that
such a rule would undermine Congress's express purpose that social clubs neither suffer nor benefit under the Code with respect to
their unrelated business income.98 The Brook court further stated
that such a reading of section 512(a)(3)(A) would grant social clubs
a tax advantage by permitting them to take section 162 deductions
unavailable to other taxpayers, i.e., for costs arising from nonprofit
activities.9 9 The Second Circuit feared that under the Sixth Circuit's theory a social club could avoid paying any income tax whatsoever by utilizing otherwise taxable investment income to subsidize meal sales to nonmembers. 10 0
The Second Circuit's fear is justified. 10 1 Section 61 states in
pertinent part that gross income includes income from interest, 10 2
rents,10 3 royalties, 04 or dividends.10 5 If an individual taxpayer derived income from any of the sources enumerated in section 61, the
93. Id. at 837. See supra notes 80-92 and accompanying text.
94. 799 F.2d at 838.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 838, 842.
97. Id. at 838. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
98. 799 F.2d at 838.
99. Id. at 838-39.
100. Id. at 839. The courts in Brook, 50 T.C.M. at 963, and Krewe, 80 T.C. at
767, also feared that if a social club deducted the expenses generated from activities which it did not engage in for profit, a subsidy situation could occur.
101. See infra notes 102-109 and accompanying text.
102. I.R.C. § 61(a)(4).
103. I.R.C. § 61(a)(5).
104. I.R.C. § 61(a)(6).
105. I.R.C. § 61(a)(7).
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taxpayer generally would be taxed on such income.'"6 Under the
Code, a taxpayer cannot deduct the costs of paying other peoples'
meals from the taxpayer's investment income.107 Therefore, the
taxpayer could use only after-tax investment dollars to pay for
other peoples' meals. As the Second Circuit stated, when a social
club offsets its investment income with the costs of meals sold to
nonmembers, the club potentially could avoid paying income tax
on otherwise taxable investment income by subsidizing the costs of
such meals.10 8 The Second Circuit noted that Congress's express
purpose behind the enactment of section 512(a)(3)(A) was that social clubs must be treated neutrally with respect to their unrelated
business income and neither suffer nor benefit under the Code. 0 9
Thus, the Sixth Circuit's holding in Cleveland Athletic Club is inconsistent with Congress's intent because it would allow a social
club to avoid paying tax on certain income while an individual taxpayer would be taxable on the same income.
The Second Circuit also submitted that the Sixth Circuit suggested that, because section 162 requires that the profit-motive
factor be established only to distinguish a "trade or business" from
a hobby, use of the "economic gain" test in lieu of the "profit motive" test does not necessarily provide a social club with a tax advantage. 10 According to the Second Circuit, use of the "economic
gain" test would provide social clubs with a tax advantage not allowed to other taxpayers; this view becomes clear when section 183
of the Code, the "hobby loss" provision, is analyzed."' Section 183
applies to "activit[ies] not engaged in for profit" and covers "any
activity other than one with respect to which deductions are allowable. . . under section 162 or under paragraph (1) or (2) of section
212."111 The court stated that, while hobbies can generate receipts
106. See I.R.C. §§ 61(a), 63, 1.
107. Under section 262 of the Code, a taxpayer generally cannot deduct personal expenses. If a taxpayer takes another out for a meal for personal purposes
the cost of such meal is a personal expense and therefore cannot be deducted.
108. 799 F.2d at 839.
109. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
110. 799 F.2d at 839.
111. Id.
112. I.R.C. § 183. Section 183 places a cap on an individual taxpayer's deduction of expenses in "activit[ies] not engaged in for profit." Roughly speaking, the
statute allows deductions for the expenses of "activit[ies] not engaged in for
profit" only to the extent that the gross income therefrom exceeds any expenses
(such as taxes and interest) which would be permitted under Chapter One of the
Code "without regard to whether or not such activity is engaged in for profit."
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or "economic gain," taxpayers engaging in them are not entitled to
a deduction under section 162; therefore, a taxpayer engaged in an
activity from which he does not intend to profit cannot avoid section 183's proscription even though he may have entered into such
activity with a basic purpose of economic gain. 113
Finally, the Second Circuit criticized the Sixth Circuit's juxtaposition of section 512(a)(3)(A) with section 512(a)(1). 114 The Second Circuit stated that the absence of the phrase "trade or business" in section 512(a)(3)(A) constituted the major difference
between the two statutes, but it also acknowledged that section
162 allows a deduction for expenses only of a trade or business. n 5
According to the Second Circuit, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that, if
section 162, via section 512(a)(3)(A), were applied literally, the
"trade or business" requirement would be read back into the statute and thereby make meaningless the omission of the phrase. 1
The Second Circuit asserted that the difference in the wording
of sections 512(a)(3)(A) and 512(a)(1) did not mean that Congress
1 17
wanted to amend section 162 to give social clubs an advantage.
The court stated that, to the contrary, the difference arises from
Congress's intent to tax organizations such as social clubs more
comprehensively than religious and charitable institutions that are
organized and operated for more altruistic purposes." 8 The Second
Circuit noted that section 512(a)(1) taxes a tax-exempt organization's income only if it arises from a trade or business whose operation is not substantially connected with the performance or exerI.R.C. § 183(b)(1). The legislative history behind the enactment of the statute
makes clear that the provision's aim was to eliminate tax benefits in situations
"where taxpayers are not carrying on a business to realize a profit, but rather are
merely attempting to utilize the losses from the operation to offset their other
income." S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 103 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3
C.B. 423, 489. In addition, although section 183 concerns "hobbies" such as dog
training, the statute applies to any activity that is not operated for profit, notwithstanding whether the activity is similar to the conventional understanding of
the word "hobby." See, e.g., Brannen, 722 F.2d at 702 n.5.
113. 799 F.2d at 839-40. The Second Circuit misreads the Sixth Circuit on
this issue-the latter court did not suggest that adoption of the "economic gain"
test in lieu of the "profit motive" test does not necessarily afford a social club a
tax advantage. See 779 F.2d 1160. In fact, the Sixth Circuit never even discussed
the issue of whether such a taxpayer could or could not receive a tax benefit. Id.
114. 799 F.2d at 840.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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cise of its educational, charitable, or other purpose constituting the
basis for its section 512 exemption. 119 Thus, the Brook court stated
that section 512(a)(1) organizations may exclude from their taxable
income interest, dividends, payments with respect to securities
loans, annuities, rental receipts, and other items of income. 2 '
In contrast, the Second Circuit continued, social clubs are
taxed on all of their income except that portion arising from dues,
fees, charges, or similar sums paid by members to provide them,
their dependents, or guests with goods, facilities, or services in fur2
therance of the tax-exempt purpose of such members' club.1 '
Thus, the Brook court held that social clubs, along with other
types of organizations referred to in section 512(a)(3)(A), are subject to a more comprehensive tax than charitable entities and, accordingly, Congress caused the deductions permitted to each type
of entity to correspond with the income to be taxed. 22
The Second Circuit further stated that, since only "trade or
business" income was taxed under section 512(a)(1), institutions
could only take deductions "directly connected" with the carrying
on of that trade or business.' 23 The Brook court noted that this
specifically eliminated deductions "directly connected" with producing income from such sources as interest, dividends, and securities loans, etc.' 24 However, the court said that, since section
512(a)(3)(A) taxes a wider range of income of social clubs, it also
permits more deductions, including many unavailable to section
512(a)(1) organizations. 125 As an example, the Second Circuit noted
that social clubs may take deductions for section 212 expenses that
arise from "non-trade" or "non-business" activities such as income
from investments, renting land, sales of property, and research.' 2 6
From this, the Second Circuit deduced that the difference in
the wording between section 512(a)(3)(A) and section 512(a)(1)
does not mean that Congress intended social clubs to be exempt
from the requirements of section 162 so that they would have a tax
advantage over other taxpayers claiming deductions under that
section; rather, Congress wished to subject social clubs to a farther
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 840-41. See I.R.C. §§ 512(a)(1), 513(a).
799 F.2d at 841.
Id. See I.R.C. §§ 512(a)(3)(A), 512(a)(3)(B).
799 F.2d at 841.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. See I.R.C. § 212.

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss2/2

18

Scialabba: The Unrelated Business Taxable Income of Social Clubs: An Analysi

1988]

UNRELATED BUSINESS INCOME OF SOCIAL CLUBS

267

reaching tax than applied to section 512(a)(1) organizations. 2 ' The
Second Circuit concluded that applying section 162 to social clubs
in the same way as it is applied to other taxpayers does not diminish in any way the distinction between these two provisions of section 512.128
The Second Circuit made the correct decision on the issue of
whether the taxpayer could deduct its net losses from sales of
meals to nonmembers from its net investment income. 29 Section
512(a)(3)(A) allows for the aggregation of deductions.'" In addition, some support exists for the Sixth Circuit's contention that
the omission of the phrase "trade or business" from section
512(a)(3)(A) establishes that the statute does not have a profitmotive requirement.' 3 ' However, the absence of this phrase also reinforces the theory that all unrelated business income and losses
must be aggregated rather than treated separately.'3 2 Support for
this contention arises from: one, the omission of the words "such
trade or business" in section 512(a)(3)(A); 1" 3 and two, the wording
of this statute, which states that allowable deductions should be
taken against "gross income" and the statute only requires that the
deductions be related to the generation of that "gross income."""
Since the absence of the phrase "trade or business" can also reinforce the aggregation proposition, the omission may only support
that theory. This weakens the Sixth Circuit's contention. Thus, after examining all the arguments on this issue, it is clear that the
Second Circuit's claim that the deductions at issue must be al127. 799 F.2d at 841.
128. Id. The Second Circuit's assertion concerning the Sixth Circuit's decision was incorrect: the Sixth Circuit never stated that applying section
512(a)(3)(A) literally to social clubs would read the "trade or business" requirement back into section 512(a)(3)(A). See 779 F.2d 1160. The Sixth Circuit, however, did compare 512(a)(3)(A) with 512(a)(1). Id. at 1165. But, as set forth above,
this comparison was primarily made to show that the absence of the phrase
"trade or business" in section 512(a)(3)(A) establishes that this provision does not
have a profit-motive requirement. See id.
129. See infra notes 130-134 and accompanying text. See also Note, The Unrelated Business Income Tax: The Treatment of Section 501(c)(7) Organizations' Outside Revenue and Losses, 6 VA. TAX REV. 535 (1987)(claiming that the
holding in the circuit court's decision in Brook has more merit than the Second
Circuit's ruling in Cleveland Athletic Club).
130. See supra notes 70-77, 79-92 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
132. See infra notes 133-134 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
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lowed under section 162 and have a profit motive is a stronger
claim than the Sixth Circuit's opposing position.
The Second Circuit's decision does not imply that the Tax
Court in Brook was incorrect when it claimed that the legislative
history behind the enactment of section 512(a)(3) made it clear
that the statute was enacted particularly to tax investment income." 5 However, the investment income of a social club is subject
135. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. The Tax Reform Studies
and Proposalsstated: "social clubs present a special problem with regard to any
income from sources outside the membership, whether such income results from
the conduct of an unrelated trade or business or passive investments." Tax Reform Studies and Proposals,supra note 68, at 316 (emphasis in original deleted,
emphasis added). The proposals also stated: if a social club "has income from
interest, dividends, rents, or royalties," the Treasury Department explained, "this
income inevitably reduces the member's cost below the actual cost of providing
the purely personal facilities made available by the organization." Id. at 42.
Congress apparently agreed with the Treasury's analysis. The House Report
on Section 512(a)(3) explained the operation of the new provision as follows:
The bill also imposes a tax on investment income of organizations
which are exempt on the grounds of mutuality or common membership.
Social clubs, for example, are operated for the benefit of members and
any profit derived from rendering the services to members. Therefore,
where a social club has income from interest, dividends, rents, royalties,
etc., this income reduces the members' costs below the actual cost of providing the personal facilities made available by the organization. Because
of this, the bill would tax the social clubs and these other membership
organizations on all income other than that derived from rendering services to the members. This income would be treated and taxed as business income [emphasis added].
H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 47 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3
C.B. 200, 231. Both the House and Senate Reports further explained the rationale
for section 512(a)(3)(A) as follows:
Since the tax exemption for social clubs and other groups is designed
to allow individuals to join together to provide recreational or social facilities or other benefits on a mutual basis, without tax consequences, the
tax exemption operates properly only when the sources of income of the
organization are limited to receipts from the membership. Under such
circumstances, the individual is in substantially the same position as if
he had spent his income on pleasure or recreation without the intervening separate organization. However, where the organization receives income from sources outside the membership, such as income from investments, upon which no tax is paid, the membership receives a benefit not
contemplated by the exemption in that untaxed dollars can be used by
the organization to provide pleasure or recreation to its membership. For
example, if a social club were to receive $10,000 of untaxed income from
investments in securities, it could use that $10,000 to reduce the cost or
increase the services it provides to its members. In such a case, the ex-
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to the unrelated business income tax to the same extent as any
other income that is subject to the tax. Therefore, a club's deductions from other unrelated business activities that meet the requirements of section 162 can reduce the amount of such club's
otherwise taxable investment income. Thus, the Tax Court incorrectly ruled against the taxpayer by relying on the legislative history accompanying section 512(a)(3) without considering that
under section 512(a)(3) investment income must be treated in the
same manner as other unrelated business taxable income.
III.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CLEVELAND ATHLETIC CLUB AND

THE BROOK CASES

The above discussion demonstrates that Cleveland Athletic
Club stands for the premise that the Sixth Circuit will allow a social club to offset its excess expenses from the sales of meals to
nonmembers against its net income from investments."' The Second Circuit established in Brook that it will not allow this type of
offset to occur.137 These conflicting decisions may have a varying
effect in their respective jurisdictions.13 8 The Second Circuit correctly feared that, in a Sixth Circuit jurisdiction, a social club can
now forego paying any income tax whatsoever by using otherwise
taxable investment income to subsidize the meals of nonmembers.'3 9 As noted above, the Sixth Circuit's position negates Congress's express purpose behind the enactment of section
512(a)(3)(A) that social clubs neither suffer nor benefit under the
Code with respect to their unrelated business income.1 40
Cleveland Athletic Club and Brook may also affect the
amount of expenses that a club would be willing to expend for the
emption is no longer simply allowing individuals to join together for recreation or pleasure without tax consequences. Rather, it is bestowing a

substantial additional advantage to the members of the club by allowing
tax-free dollars to be used for their personal recreational or pleasure purposes. The extension of the exemption to such investment income is,
therefore, a distortion of its purpose.
Id. at 48 (emphasis added). S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1969), reprinted in C.B. 423, 469-70.
136. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
137. 799 F.2d 833.
138. See infra-notes 139-149, 152-158 and accompanying text.
139. See infra note 140 and accompanying text; see supra notes 100-109 and
accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 101-109 and accompanying text.
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provision of meals to nonmembers.14 ' Since a social club in a Sixth
Circuit jurisdiction can take the deductions at issue, such a club
may incur more expenses from the sale of food and beverages to
nonmembers (i.e., by charging such nonmembers less for meals)
than a club in a Second Circuit jurisdiction.142 This could foster
better relations between club members and nonmembers in a Sixth
4 8
Circuit jurisdiction.
In addition, the holding of the Sixth Circuit can lead to dangerous precedent.14 4 As mentioned above, under section
512(a)(3)(A), a deduction must be "allowed by Chapter One."'4 5
The Cleveland Athletic Club court allowed the deduction for the
excess meals expenses even though these expenditures did not
meet the requirements of section 162.'14 However, section 162 is
the only section in Chapter One under which such expenses could
feasibly be deducted. 47 By still allowing these food and beverage
expenses to be deductible under section 512(a)(3)(A), the Sixth
Circuit in essence created a new deduction provision.14 Thus, taxpayers in this jurisdiction may attempt to extend the Tax Court's
holding by arguing that other currently nondeductible expenses
should be allowed to offset income. 4"
The Sixth Circuit, however, is not wholly to blame for this incorrect decision.' Section 512(a)(3)(A) is ambiguous. The drafters
of this statute should have enumerated the specific deduction provisions of the Code that they were referring to in the phrase "deductions allowed by this chapter."''
Although the two conflicting decisions will have some impact
141. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
142. A club that can take the deductions at issue can offset more taxable
income and therefore have more disposable income than a club that cannot.
143. This is based on the assumption that allowing nonmembers to pay less
for meals causes them to have better feelings toward members than do nonmembers who pay more for meals.
144. See infra notes 145-149 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
146. 779 F.2d 1160.
147. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
148. This newly created section allows deductions for ordinary and necessary
trade or business expenses for activities not engaged in for profit.
149. This is based on the idiomatic premise: "You give 'em an inch and
they'll take a yard!"
150. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
151. See I.R.C. § 512(a)(3)(A).
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on the taxation of social clubs,"5 2 Brook has narrower precedential
value, even in its own jurisdiction, than it would appear at first
glance. 153 As mentioned above, the taxpayer in Brook stipulated
15 4
that its sale of meals to nonmembers lacked a profit motive.
Therefore, after the Second Circuit decided that section
512(a)(3)(A) requires that the proposed deduction at issue must
still have a profit motive, 5 5 the taxpayer's stipulation made it easy
for the court to apply its rule and hold against The Brook. 5 6 It is
uncertain how the Second Circuit or many other courts, other than
the Sixth Circuit, would decide a case where a social club wishes to
deduct expenses from sales of meals to nonmembers and the club
does not stipulate whether or not the sales activity was entered
into with a profit motive. This may cause some administrative inconvenience because courts might have to grapple with whether
the activities at issue are entered into for a profit. If the IRS has to
claim that a social club's sales of food and beverages to nonmembers are not a profit-motivated activity, it may stand on weak
ground.5 7 In Pittsburgh Press Club v. United States,5 the government argued successfully that a social club's nonmember food
and beverage sales activity may operate at a tax loss and still constitute a profitable business for purposes of revoking the club's
tax-exempt status.
Finally, the IRS' future litigation plans with regard to Cleveland Athletic Club can be found in its action on decision issued on
152. See supra notes 138-149 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 154-158 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
155. 799 F.2d at 838.
156. See id.
157. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
158. 536 F.2d 572 (3d Cir. 1976), after remand, 579 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1978),
after second remand, 615 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1980). In Pittsburgh Press Club, the
IRS audited the taxpayer social club in 1970. 615 F.2d at 602. The government
determined that the club's gross receipts from nonmembers were in excess of 11,
16, and 17 percent of its total receipts (excluding initiation fees) for the fiscal
years 1967, 1968, and 1969 respectively. Id. at 604. The IRS further found that
nonmember receipts in the three years under audit totaled over $281,000. Id.
Treas. Reg. § 1.301(c)(7)-1(b) (1987) sets forth that a club that engages in business, such as by making its facilties available to the public, is not exempt. Rev.
Rul. 60-324, 1960-2 C.B. 173, 175, and Rev. Proc. 64-36, 1964-2 C.B. 962, provided
guidelines for permissible levels of nonmember receipts. In PittsburghPress Club,
the taxpayer exceeded these guidelines. 615 F.2d at 604. Therefore, the Pittsburgh Press Club court upheld the IRS' revocation of the club's exempt status
pursuant to section 1.501(c)(7)-1(b). Id. at 606.
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May 14, 1986.' In this action on decision, the IRS recommended
not requesting certiorari of the Sixth Circuit's decision in Cleveland Athletic Club.1 60 In deciding not to seek certiorari, even
though the IRS believes that "the Sixth Circuit's opinion subverts
Congressional intention," the IRS said that it "could not now establish a case for administrative importance warranting Supreme
Court review."'' Moreover, the IRS noted that a potential for developing an inter-circuit conflict existed in Brook and stated that
in the interim it would stop litigating the issue in the Sixth Circuit."8 2 As of this writing, the IRS has not appealed Cleveland Ath159. Cleveland Athletic Club, 779 F.2d 1160, action on decision, 1986-026
(May 14, 1986).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. Evidence of the IRS' position with regard to the Brook and the
Cleveland Athletic Club cases can also be found in Tech. Adv. Mem. 87-29-001
(Dec. 29, 1986). In this ruling, the issue was whether losses that consistently arose
over a number of years from a section 501(c)(7) organization's sales of meals to
nonmembers could be offset against income from temporary investments in order
to determine such entity's unrelated business income tax. Tech. Adv. Mem. 87-29001 (Dec. 29, 1986). The IRS stated that, although the Cleveland Athletic Club
court arrived at a different holding, both Rev. Rul. 81-69 and the Brook court
state that a social club cannot offset losses from such sales against its investment
income. Id. The government further claimed that there is no reason why income
from short term investments should change the treatment of losses from the sales
of meals to nonmembers. Id. Accordingly, the section 501(c)(7) organization was
not allowed to take the deductions at issue. Id.
The most recent indication of the IRS' position with regard to the Brook and
the Cleveland Athletic Club cases arises from an action on decision which dealt
with South End Italian Indep. Club, Inc. v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 168 (1986)
action on decision, 1987-015 (June 15, 1987). In South End, a tax-exempt social
club conducted bingo games. 87 T.C. at 169. Under Massachusetts law, the net
proceeds of such games had to be donated for charitable, religious, and educational uses. Id. The club donated its net proceeds from its bingo games pursuant
to the Massachusetts law. Id. at 171. The club also had unrelated business taxable
income. Id. at 170. The Tax Court, citing, from among other sources, the appellate decision in Cleveland Athletic Club and Tax Reform Studies and Proposals,
supra note 68, pt. 3, at 325, supra note 66, stated that a social club can take
deductions allowed by section 162 against any taxable income, whether or not
generated by a trade or business. Id. at 174. Thus, the court allowed the donations to be deductible from its unrelated business taxable income as an expense
under section 162. Id. at 177. In the action on decision, the IRS agreed that the
South End Italian Club's distribution of net proceeds from the bingo games pursuant to the Massachusetts law constituted ordinary and necessary business expenses under section 162. Action on Decison 1987-015. However, the government
disagreed with the court's decision that a social club may deduct expenses under
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letic Club.
IV.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

16 3 decided on
In North Ridge Country Club v. Commissioner,
September 15, 1987, the Tax Court dealt with somewhat the same
issue that was presented in the Brook and the Cleveland Athletic
Club cases. In this case, the taxpayer, an exempt social club, received nonexempt income from interest and the following nonmember activities: golfing fees, golf cart rentals, and guest fees.""
The taxpayer also incurred net unrelated business losses from the
sales of food and beverages to nonmembers. 6 ' On its 1979 tax return, the taxpayer offset its net losses from the sales of meals to
nonmembers against its net nonexempt income. 66 The IRS ob67

jected to these proposed deductions.

The Tax Court, retreating from its earlier position in Krewe'"I
and Brook, 6 9 held that excess expenses arising from different unrelated business activities could be aggregated.1 70 The court based
its decision on the language of section 512(a)(3)(A) and its legislative history.17 ' The Tax Court also held that a deduction under
section 512(a)(3)(A) requires a profit motive.17 2 However, unlike
section 162 notwithstanding whether the activity at issue is a trade or business.
Id. The action on decision cited in Brook, 799 F.2d 833 and Rev. Rul. 81-69, 19811 C.B. 351(see supra note 22) as authority for its claim. Id.
163. 89 T.C. __
, No. 40 (1987).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. 80 T.C. 755 (1983). See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
169. 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 959 (1985), afJ'd, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 133, aff'd, 799 F.2d
833 (2d Cir. 1986). See supra notes 36-54 and accompanying text.
170. 89 T.C.
-,
No. 40.

171. Id. The court quoted congressional reports which stated in pertinent
part:
The computation of income subject to the tax would be similar in
most respects to the computation presently applicable under the unrelated business income tax in general. However, consistent with the elimination of the 'trade or business regularly carried on' tests, deductions
would be allowable if directly connected with an activity generating income subject to tax, rather than only if directly connected with an unrelated trade or business regularly carried on.
Treasury Tax Reform Proposals, supra note 57, at 5139-41, cited in 89 T.C.
__,

No. 40.
172. 89 T.C.

__

, No. 40.
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the Second Circuit in Brook, the Tax Court decided that the
profit-motive requirement was satisfied merely upon a showing
that a social club has the objective of having an "incremental increase in available funds" rather than a "taxable profit.

1 73

This

seems to mean that the court essentially adopted the Sixth Circuit's "economic gain" theory. The Tax Court, ruling in favor of
the social club, found that the taxpayer entered into the meal sales
17
with a profit motive. '
If North Ridge Country Club is appealed, the appeal would be
to the Ninth Circuit.1 75 It would be interesting to know what approach the Ninth Circuit would utilize to resolve the issue.
V.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

There now exists a split of decisions between the Second and
the Sixth Circuits involving a social club's ability to deduct its excess expenses from sales of meals to nonmembers against its net
investment income. Both courts agree that section 512(a)(3)(A) allows for the aggregation of deductions. However, while the Second
Circuit claims that the section 162 requirement must be met before
a club can offset its expenses from its sales of meals against its net
investment income, the Sixth Circuit does not impose this requirement. The Second Circuit espouses the correct position. These
conflicting decisions can be rectified if Congress would enumerate
with greater specificity the deductions that can be taken under section 512(a)(3)(A).

173. Id at 1162.
174. Id at 1164. Accord Portland Golf Club v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M.
(CCH) 212 (1988) (holding in favor of the taxpayer on the basis of Northridge

Country Club).
175. The taxpayer's principal place of activity and business is Fair Oaks, California. The Ninth Circuit's jurisdiction embodies California. See Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aff'd. 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 940 (1971).
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